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SO MUCH ACTIVITY, SO LITTLE CHANGE: A REPLY TO THE 
CRITICS OF BATTERED WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE 
KIT KINPORTS* 
Prior to 1970, the term “domestic violence” referred to ghetto riots and 
urban terrorism, not the abuse of women by their intimate partners.1  Today, of 
course, domestic violence is a household word.  After all, it has now been ten 
years since the revelation of football star O.J. Simpson’s history of battering 
purportedly sounded “‘a wake-up call for all of America’”;2 ten years since 
Congress enacted legislation haled as “‘a milestone . . . truly a turning point in 
the national effort to break the cycle’” of violence;3 and twenty years since 
Farrah Fawcett’s portrayal of Francine Hughes in the movie The Burning Bed 
supposedly “left an indelible mark upon society’s collective consciousness.”4  
Despite these and numerous other “milestones” and “wake-up calls,” domestic 
violence continues to be a seemingly intractable problem in this country.  
Substantial numbers of women are still beaten by their husbands and 
boyfriends every day, and many of them die as a result.5  A much smaller 
number of women strike back and kill their abusers, but it is these cases – and 
 
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.  A.B. 1976, Brown University; J.D. 1980, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
 1. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements 
on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 n.42 (2000). 
 2. Fred Brown, New Domestic Violence Laws Take Effect: State Makes It Easier to Keep 
Abusers at Bay, DENV. POST, July 2, 1994, at B1 (quoting U.S. Representative Patricia 
Schroeder). 
 3. George Lardner, The Law Stops at the State Line: Ignorance, Confusion Paralyze the 
Cops, WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at C3 (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno’s description of 
the Violence Against Women Act). 
 4. Jay B. Rosman, Domestic Violence: Recent Amendments to the Florida Statutes, 20 
NOVA L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1995).  Francine Hughes, a battered woman who killed her sleeping 
husband in 1977, was ultimately acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity.  See FAITH 
MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980); THE BURNING BED (Anchor Bay Entertainment 1984) 
(starring Farrah Fawcett). 
 5. I use gendered terms here because statistics show that the overwhelming majority of 
domestic batteries involve men assaulting women.  See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH 
WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000) (finding that 85% 
of reported incidents were perpetrated by men).  For statistics on the overall incidence of 
domestic violence and intimate-partner killings, see infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. 
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the self-defense issues they raise – that seem to receive a disproportionate 
share of the attention.6 
The most troublesome self-defense questions arise, of course, in cases 
involving non-confrontational killings – where the woman struck back before 
or after a beating, or, most controversially, when her abuser was asleep.  
Although statistically most killings do not fall into this category,7 they raise the 
most difficult questions and have generated the most interest.  Can a woman 
who kills under these circumstances legitimately argue that she acted in self-
defense – that, pursuant to the prevailing definition of the defense, she honestly 
and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
harm?8  A number of critics contend that she cannot, and it is my purpose here 
to evaluate the various arguments they have advanced. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In some respects, much has changed in the intervening years since the term 
“domestic violence” entered the public consciousness.  Beginning in 1976, 
state legislatures began to enact domestic violence reform statutes that made 
available at least temporary orders of protection on an ex parte basis and 
authorized longer-term protective orders with far-reaching remedies.9  Within 
four years, such legislation had been passed in forty-five states and the District 
of Columbia, and it now exists in all fifty states.10  In 1994, after four years of 
intensive lobbying by women’s groups, Congress passed the Violence Against 
Women Act, the first comprehensive federal response to the problem of 
 
 6. A recent Lexis search using the terms “battered women” and “self-defense” yielded 772 
law journal articles, but only 198 court opinions during the past ten years.  When the search was 
narrowed to “battered women w/10 self-defense and date > 1992,” 373 journal articles and only 
62 court opinions were retrieved. 
 7. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 396-401 (1991) (noting that her findings – 
that three-fourths of the 223 killings she studied occurred under confrontational circumstances – 
confirmed similar results in other studies); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2001) (reaching similar findings in a survey of seventy cases where battered 
women charged with homicide raised self-defense claims and imminence was at issue). 
 8. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 
(1986). 
 9. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 
498 (2001).  In addition to prohibiting the abuser from committing further acts of violence, an 
order of protection may bar him from having any contact with the victim whatsoever and may 
also grant her other remedies – including possession of the residence or other property, custody, 
child support, or other economic relief.  See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, 
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910-1030 (1993). 
 10. See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 498. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] SO MUCH ACTIVITY, SO LITTLE CHANGE 157 
 
domestic violence.11  Among other things, this federal legislation authorized 
the expenditure of almost a third of a billion dollars for battered women’s 
shelters over a five-year period, required states to recognize and enforce 
protective orders entered in other states, and made it a federal crime to cross 
state lines in order to violate an order of protection.12 
In the realm of criminal law, state legislatures have taken a variety of steps 
in an effort to alter the law’s traditional laissez faire attitude toward domestic 
violence.13  Although the police historically were not allowed to make 
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors like assault unless the crime was 
committed in their presence, nearly every state has now expanded police arrest 
powers to change that rule for domestic violence cases.14  Faced with police 
reluctance to exercise those powers, in 1977 Oregon became the first state to 
enact a mandatory arrest law, requiring the police to arrest where they had 
probable cause to believe a domestic battery had occurred.15  Today, twenty-
one other states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar legislation.16  
In addition, some states have increased the penalties for domestic battery,17 and 
some have even created specialized domestic violence courts to handle these 
cases.18 
Nevertheless, battered women continue to confront hurdles as they attempt 
to avail themselves of the fruits of these reform efforts.  There still is not 
enough shelter space to meet the needs of domestic violence victims.  A survey 
in New York City several years ago found that the city’s shelters could 
 
 11. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). 
 12. Id. at 1926-34.  The act’s most controversial provision, however, which created a federal 
civil damages action against anyone who committed a crime of violence motivated by gender, 
was struck down by the Supreme Court.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress power to reach intrastate, 
non-economic activity even if it had an “aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” and that the 
legislation could not be justified under Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it was aimed at private individuals.  Id. at 617, 626. 
 13. See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 164-67 (1987) (describing 
the law’s historic reluctance to intervene in such “private” matters, as evidenced by the “rule of 
thumb,” which permitted a man to beat his wife so long as he used a stick no bigger than his 
thumb). 
 14. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1184 (2002). 
 15. See OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (2001). 
 16. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 14, at 1184-85 (citing statutes).  An additional 
seven states have enacted legislation providing that arrests are preferred in domestic violence 
cases.  See id.  For discussion of the impact of mandatory arrest laws, see infra note 27. 
 17. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic 
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1578 n.302 (1998). 
 18. See Tsai, supra note 1. 
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accommodate only one-quarter of requests.19  Further, some experts estimate 
that as many as half of all women and children who are homeless today are 
fleeing from violent homes.20 
The civil protective order process has proven to be far from a panacea, as it 
has become apparent that seeking an order of protection can be a risky 
proposition for a battered woman.  It can be risky in a physical sense: 
“[b]attering is about domination,”21 and batterers often react violently when 
they feel they are losing control – when women try to leave or otherwise assert 
their independence, for example, by filing for an order of protection.22  The 
protective order process can also be risky for mothers because state authorities 
are increasingly bringing abuse and neglect proceedings as well as criminal 
failure-to-protect charges against them, not only when children are themselves 
victims of abuse but also when they are exposed to abuse by witnessing 
beatings received by their mothers.23  Moreover, it is now more common for a 
batterer to respond to a woman’s request for a protective order by likewise 
seeking an order against her, and judges are often tempted to grant such mutual 
orders of protection.24  Finally, enforcement issues continue to be the 
 
 19. See The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with “Failure 
to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 859 (2000) (citing 1997-98 
figures).  An oft-cited Senate Report found in 1992 that there are three times as many animal 
shelters as shelters for battered women in this country.  See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF 
AMERICA 26 (Comm. Print 1992).  See also Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, 
Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered 
Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1020-21 (1995) (describing the reasons why 
African-American women are hesitant to turn to shelters). 
 20. See Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm 
of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1076 
(1995). 
 21. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (1991). 
 22. See Tsai, supra note 1, at 1292 (citing studies finding that 50% to 60% of protective 
orders are violated within two years, and a third study which reported that “17% of victims killed 
in domestic incidents had obtained orders of protection”); Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits 
Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18 (quoting forensic psychiatrist Park Dietz’s statement, “‘[a] 
restraining order is a way of getting killed faster’”).  For further discussion of the dangers of 
leaving an abusive relationship, see infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 193 (2003) (concluding that an order of protection can be “a license to entrap” 
rather than “a ticket to freedom”); The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 19, at 
849; Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom?  A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272 (2001). 
 24. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 75-76 (noting that mutual orders are “routinely” granted 
in some jurisdictions); Philip Trompeter, Gender Bias Task Force: Comments on Family Law 
Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001) (finding that “[m]ore than half of the family 
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“Achilles’ heel” of the protective order system.25  Although studies suggest 
that at least half of protective orders are violated at least once, and many are 
violated repeatedly,26 the police are still much more likely to arrest in a case 
involving stranger assault, and they are reluctant to arrest unless the abuser 
committed some independent crime.27  Judges are similarly loathe to 
 
law attorneys [surveyed by the Virginia Gender Bias Task Force] report that courts issue mutual 
protective orders where allegations do not warrant their issuance”); Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, Why 
Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective 
Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1054 n.119 (1992) (citing findings from three state gender 
bias studies). 
 25. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: 
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 49 (1990).  See also Kit 
Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 220-46 (1993) 
(describing the enforcement problems reported in a nationwide survey of domestic violence 
organizations). 
 26. See Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic 
Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 240 (Eve S. Buzawa 
& Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (finding that 60% of orders were violated within one year 
following their issuance); Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male 
Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS 
WORK?, supra, at 192, 199-200 (reporting that almost half of all orders were violated within two 
years).  According to one of these studies, more than one-quarter of women were subjected to 
severe violence in the year after they obtained an order of protection, more than one-fifth received 
death threats, and more than half experienced psychological abuse.  See Harrell & Smith, supra, 
at 223-25.  See also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Eve S. Buzawa, Thomas L. Austin & Carl G. Buzawa, The Role of Arrest in 
Domestic Versus Stranger Assault: Is There a Difference?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING 
ORDERS WORK?, supra note 26, at 150, 161 (finding that “incidents involving strangers result in 
an arrest 33% of the time, compared with 28% for acquaintances and 18% for domestic”).  See 
also Ammons, supra note 19, at 1022-29 (describing the greater hurdles African-American 
women face in trying to obtain police protection).  Note that the overwhelming majority of states 
make the violation of protective orders a crime, although it can lead to felony charges in only six 
states.  See Klein & Orloff, supra note 9, at 1096-97. 
  Police reluctance to arrest is evident even in states with mandatory arrest laws.  In those 
jurisdictions, the police may refuse to arrest despite the mandatory arrest requirement on the 
grounds that they lack probable cause, see Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 210 (1997), or they may delay so long in responding that the batterer 
is no longer on the scene when they arrive.  See Buzawa, Austin & Buzawa, supra, at 156 (citing 
National Criminal Victimization Survey finding that “police respond within 5 minutes in 36% of 
cases in which the offender is a stranger and in only 24% of cases in which the offender is an 
intimate”).  Moreover, mandatory arrest laws have had the effect of increasing the number of 
women arrested, as the practice of dual arrests has become more common.  See Hart, supra, at 
210.  At least fourteen state legislatures have responded to this last trend by amending their 
mandatory arrest statutes to authorize arrest of only the primary aggressor.  See Cecelia M. 
Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the 
Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 185 n.113 (1999) (citing statutes).  While some believe that 
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incarcerate, and “few batterers ever see the inside of a jail cell, even when 
convicted of a serious offense”; instead, probation is the most common 
sanction for such violations.28 
Most importantly, the incidence of domestic violence is still unacceptably 
high.  In 1992, the Surgeon General reported that domestic violence was the 
“‘single largest cause of injury to women in the United States.’”29  More recent 
statistics show that more than one-fifth of all women report having been 
physically assaulted by their partner at some point in their lives.30  At least one 
million women experience such assaults each year,31 and some put the figure 
much higher.32  Moreover, while the number of women killed by their partners 
has declined in recent years,33 that figure has not decreased as dramatically as 
the overall murder rate.34 
 
such amendments have been effective, see Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step 
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 565, others 
report that the police continue to arrest women, especially women of color.  See Espenoza, supra, 
at 185-86. 
  It is important to note that some studies question whether arrests are even effective in 
deterring domestic abuse.  See Jannell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter 
Domestic Violence?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 26, at 43, 
48-49 (reporting that arrests reduced domestic violence only in certain cities, only for employed 
batterers, and only in the short run). 
 28. Hanna, supra note 17, at 1523. 
 29. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 36-37 (1990) (quoting Susan MacManus & Nikki Van 
Hightower, Limits on State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement 
Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 269, 269 (1989)). 
 30. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF 
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (2000) 
(22.1% of women surveyed in the 1995-96 National Violence Against Women Survey). 
 31. See id. (reporting an annual total of 4.5 million physical assaults affecting 1.3 million 
women, for an annual victimization rate of 44.2 assaults per 1,000 women over the age of 
seventeen). 
 32. See S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 30 (1990) (estimating that three to four million women are 
battered each year). 
 33. In 1971, for example, at least 1,077 women were murdered by their husbands, see 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1971: UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS 9, 114 (1972) [hereinafter 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS], whereas at least 1034 
women were killed by their husbands or boyfriends in 2001.  See FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2001: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (2002) 
[hereinafter 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].  I use the term “at least” here because the 
relationship among the parties is unreported for some homicides. 
 34. The total number of murders decreased by 35.3% between 1991 and 2001, while the 
number of women killed by their partners decreased by only 22.3%.  Compare FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1991: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 13, 19 
(1992) (24,703 total murder victims, 1,330 of whom were women killed by their partners), with 
2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 19, 24 (15,980 total murder victims, 1,034 of 
whom were women killed by their partners). 
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While it used to be conventional wisdom that women committed half of all 
spouse killings,35 recent years have witnessed a change in that figure.  Now, 
approximately three-quarters of intimate-partner killings involve male 
perpetrators and female victims.36  What has remained constant, however, is 
that approximately one-third of all female murder victims each year are killed 
by their partners.37  By comparison, only a small percentage of male victims 
are killed by their wives or girlfriends.38  Nevertheless, it is that small minority 
of homicides – killings that often take place in the context of an abusive 
relationship39 – that have attracted so much attention. 
Although the number of battered women who kill has remained small, the 
domestic violence reform movement has not ignored the self-defense issues 
arising in those cases.  Initially, battered women encountered evidentiary 
hurdles when they tried to introduce expert psychological testimony describing 
the so-called “battered woman syndrome”40 in support of their self-defense 
 
 35. See, e.g., 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9 (reporting that 52% of the 
spouse killings that year were perpetrated by husbands); Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Sociological 
Analysis of Homicide, in STUDIES IN HOMICIDE 15, 23 (Marvin E. Wolfgang ed., 1967) (finding 
that 53 of the 100 spouse killings reported in Philadelphia between 1948 and 1952 were 
committed by men). 
 36. The 1,034 women murdered by their husbands or boyfriends in 2001 represented 77.8% 
of intimate-partner killings.  See 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 24. 
 37. Compare 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9, 114 (reporting that 
31.2% of female murder victims were killed by their husbands), with 2001 UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS, supra note 33, at 27 (reporting that 32.2% of female murder victims were killed by 
their husbands or boyfriends). 
 38. In 2001, only 2.8% of male murder victims were killed by their wives or girlfriends; in 
1971, 7.8% of male victims were killed by their wives.  See 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 
supra note 33, at 22-27; 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9, 114.  See also 
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
FACTBOOK: VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES 5 (1998) (reporting similar percentages for the period 
1976-96).  These murder figures are consistent with the general findings that “violence against 
women is predominantly intimate partner violence,” whereas “men are predominantly victimized 
by strangers.”  TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 30, at 46. 
 39. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 520 (1996) 
(citing studies concluding that “at least forty-five percent and perhaps as many as ninety-seven 
percent [of women imprisoned for killing a partner] were abused by the person they killed”).  See 
also Maguigan, supra note 7, at 397 n.67 (reporting that “[m]ost female homicide defendants had 
been battered by the men whom they killed”); Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse 
Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1454 n.123 
(1998). 
 40. The term originated with psychologist Lenore Walker.  See generally LENORE WALKER, 
THE BATTERED WOMAN xv (1979).  For a description of the battered woman syndrome, see infra 
notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
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claims.  Now, such testimony is routinely admitted in every state,41 often as a 
result of judicial decision, but sometimes by virtue of legislation.42  Likewise, 
some state legislatures have amended their self-defense laws to make clear that 
prior acts of domestic violence on the part of the decedent are admissible.43  In 
addition, a number of courts now require that trial judges give jury instructions 
explaining how such testimony is relevant to the defendant’s self-defense 
claim.44 
Some courts have gone even further, taking the position that the objective 
element of self-defense – which asks whether the defendant’s belief in the need 
for defensive force was reasonable – must be evaluated by considering how a 
“reasonable battered woman,” or a reasonable person with the defendant’s 
history of abuse, would have perceived the situation.45  In Bechtel v. State, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals went further still, adopting a special jury 
instruction for battered women’s self-defense cases that struck the pattern jury 
instruction’s reference to “a reasonable person” and instead advised the jury to 
consider whether “a person, in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of the 
 
 41. See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in 
Criminal Cases, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF 
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 3 (1996). 
 42. See id. at 15 (citing twelve such state statutes).  Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 558 (2001) (observing that courts have been 
more receptive than legislatures to battered women’s self-defense claims and that “most of the 
favorable legislation simply ratified previous court decisions”). 
 43. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d)(1) (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050(3) 
(Banks-Baldwin 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.061 (1997).  See also LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 
404A(2) (West 1995) (creating an exception to the usual rule – which bars evidence of a victim’s 
“dangerous character” absent “a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim” – 
for self-defense cases involving “a history of assaultive behavior” between parties who “lived in a 
familial or intimate relationship”). 
 44. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997) (requiring modification of 
pattern self-defense instruction “in all battered person syndrome cases” to make clear that 
“evidence that the defendant suffers from battered person syndrome . . . relates to the issue of the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of force was immediately necessary, even 
though no use of force against the defendant may have been, in fact, imminent”); Boykins v. 
State, 995 P.2d 474, 479 (Nev. 2000) (requiring instruction informing the jury that evidence of 
battered woman syndrome may be considered “when determining the defendant’s state of mind at 
the time of the killing and whether she acted in self-defense,” and in evaluating “the 
reasonableness of her belief that she was about to suffer imminent death or great bodily harm”). 
 45. See Smith, 486 S.E.2d at 822-23; State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988); State 
v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“an otherwise reasonable person who is 
suffering from battered spouse syndrome”); Boykins, 995 P.2d at 476; State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 
564, 575 (N.J. 1997); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); State v. 
Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Ohio 1997).  But cf. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 
1996), described infra at notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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defendant, would reasonably have believed that she was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm.”46 
Finally, a few states have amended their substantive self-defense rules in 
other ways in an effort to make the law more responsive to battered women 
defendants.  In Weiand v. State, for example, the Florida Supreme Court 
overturned one of its prior decisions and modified the castle exception to its 
retreat rule so that a defendant is no longer required to retreat before using 
deadly force at home against a cohabitant.47  The court reached that decision in 
part because of its belief that “[i]mposing a duty to retreat from the home may 
adversely impact victims of domestic violence” and “[a] jury instruction on the 
duty to retreat may reinforce common myths about domestic violence.”48  
While the Florida change applies to all criminal cases, the Kentucky legislature 
 
 46. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).  The text of the jury instruction 
the court adopted for cases involving battered women is as follows (with the language omitted 
from the pattern jury instruction in brackets): 
A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense if that person [reasonably] 
believed that use of deadly force was necessary to protect herself from imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm.  Self-defense is a defense although the danger to life or 
personal security may not have been real, if a [reasonable] person, in the circumstances 
and from the viewpoint of the defendant, would reasonably have believed that she was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
Id.  Cf. Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363, 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining that the approach 
adopted in Bechtel applies only in cases involving battered women and that “[i]n all other self-
defense cases, [the pattern jury instruction] is to be administered in its original form”). 
  The concurring opinion in Bechtel called the majority’s approach somewhat “puzzling” 
because the modified instruction “include[d] the reasonableness requirement” in the last clause 
despite the court’s purported intent to “‘strik[e] the words “reasonably” and “reasonable” from 
[the] instruction.’”  See Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 15-16 (Parks, J., concurring in the result) (quoting 
the majority opinion).  But cf. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (similarly 
holding that a “defendant’s conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious person 
might or might not do or consider necessary to do under the like circumstances,” but instead 
requiring the jury “to place itself as best it can in the shoes of the accused, and then decide 
whether or not the particular circumstances surrounding the accused at the time he used force 
were sufficient to create in his mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the use of force was 
necessary to protect himself”). 
 47. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1050-57 (Fla. 1999).  The majority of jurisdictions in 
this country do not require a defender to retreat before resorting to self-defense.  In the minority 
of states (like Florida) that do impose a retreat requirement, almost all have adopted a “castle 
doctrine” exception for the home, although they disagree as to whether that castle exception 
applies when one is attacked at home by a co-occupant.  See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 
5.7(f). 
 48. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052, 1054.  See also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570-71 
(N.J. 1997) (agreeing that the cohabitant exception to the castle doctrine “disadvantage[s] 
women” and is “inherently unfair” to battered women, and therefore “commend[ing] to the 
Legislature consideration of the application of the retreat doctrine in the case of a spouse battered 
in her own home”). 
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has amended its self-defense statute for domestic violence cases only, adopting 
a definition of “imminence” that makes clear that “in the context of domestic 
violence and abuse . . . , belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a 
past pattern of repeated serious abuse.”49 
As explained below,50 these are far from radical changes to well-accepted 
self-defense doctrine.  Nevertheless, much has been written, both on these 
reforms specifically and more generally on the topic of battered women’s self-
defense.  The notion that battered women who kill under non-confrontational 
circumstances might have a legitimate self-defense claim has been subject to 
criticism on a variety of fronts.  It is my purpose here to evaluate these 
criticisms. 
In so doing, I have catalogued the objections into five categories.  Part II 
addresses the claim that battered women cannot hope to satisfy the objective 
“reasonableness” requirement of the self-defense standard.  Part III then 
describes various criticisms leveled at the battered woman syndrome theory, 
and Part IV considers the imminence requirement as applied in this context.  
Part V discusses the contention that battered women are really advancing an 
excuse rather than a justification for their act, and Part VI analyzes the 
argument that these self-defense claims raise the specter of determinism and 
create an “abuse excuse.”  After examining these various objections, I 
conclude that, while recent advances in psychological research have shed light 
on the effects of battering and on the best way of presenting that information in 
support of a battered woman’s self-defense claim, most of these critiques are 
misguided and, as I have argued elsewhere,51 even non-confrontational killings 
by battered women can fit within traditional self-defense doctrine. 
II.  THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY 
Critics of battered women’s self-defense claims often focus on the 
objective component of the self-defense standard, arguing that even if a 
battered woman who killed under non-confrontational circumstances honestly 
believed that defensive force was necessary,52 her belief could not have been 
reasonable.53  But, under conventional self-defense doctrine, the objective 
 
 49. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.010(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999). 
 50. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility of the 
abuser’s prior violence) & 60-74 (analyzing the reasonable battered woman standard). 
 51. See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393 
(1988). 
 52. In some jurisdictions, an honest, unreasonable belief in the need to use defensive force 
gives rise to a claim of “imperfect” self-defense, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.  See 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 231-32 (3d ed. 2001). 
 53. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3, 12. 
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element of the defense asks whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
circumstances would have believed she was in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm.54  For example, the criminal law has traditionally 
permitted defendants to introduce evidence of the decedent’s violent history or 
reputation to support their claim that they both honestly – and reasonably – 
believed the decedent posed a threat to them.55 
Thus, even the so-called “objective” standard of self-defense is not 
completely objective, but at least partially particularistic – and rightly so, 
because otherwise defendants are held to an unrealistic standard.  As Susan 
Estrich has observed, “a purely objective standard is unduly harsh because it 
ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably shape the defender’s 
perspective, thus holding him (or her) to a standard he simply cannot meet.”56 
A battered woman’s history and pattern of battering are among the 
circumstances relevant in evaluating what a reasonable person in her situation 
would have believed.57  As one court explained, self-defense law “requires the 
jury to place itself figuratively in the defendant’s shoes and to determine the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief from the facts and circumstances as 
the defendant perceived them,” and “[i]n order to determine what constituted 
‘defendant’s shoes,’ the jury must know whether or not a defendant is a 
battered person.”58  In fact, this evidence is no different from the evidence of 
the decedent’s violent actions or propensities that has long been admitted in 
support of self-defense claims.59 
 
 54. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (denying that “an objective 
standard [of self-defense] means that the background and other relevant characteristics of a 
particular actor must be ignored,” and instead observing that “a determination of reasonableness 
must be based on the ‘circumstances’ facing a defendant or his ‘situation,’” including “any 
relevant knowledge the defendant had about [the victim]” and “any prior experiences he had 
which could provide a reasonable basis for a belief . . . that the use of deadly force was necessary 
under the circumstances”).  See generally DRESSLER, supra note 52, at 238. 
 55. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896). 
 56. Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1434 (1990).  See also 
Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?  A Critical 
Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 449-50 (1981) 
(concluding that “[t]he result of taking into account the social reality of the accused is a more 
realistic assessment of his or her culpability”). 
 57. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 53, at 11; Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis & Megan 
Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between 
Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 90. 
 58. People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
 59. See Parrish, supra note 41, at iv (noting that “[a]ny defendant claiming self-defense 
would want to bring in information about the deceased’s history of violence against her or him,” 
and therefore “[t]his type of ‘social context’ information is not unique to battered women’s self-
defense claims”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
166 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
 
Similarly, the so-called “reasonable battered woman” standard adopted by 
some courts is just a short-hand description for the conventional “reasonable 
person under the circumstances” standard that courts apply in all self-defense 
cases.  Thus, it makes no sense for the California Supreme Court to take the 
position it articulates in People v. Humphrey, where it disclaims any intent to 
“replace the reasonable ‘person’ standard with a reasonable ‘battered woman’ 
standard” – reasoning that “the ultimate question is whether a reasonable 
person, not a reasonable battered woman, would believe in the need to kill to 
prevent imminent harm” – but then goes on to hold that “the jury, in 
determining objective reasonableness, must view the situation from the 
defendant’s perspective” and “must consider all of the relevant circumstances 
in which defendant found herself.”60  The court acknowledges, as it must, that 
the defendant’s history of abuse is one of “the relevant circumstances” to be 
considered, and it does not deny that her experience as a battered woman must 
have colored her “perspective.”61  Thus, the objective standard it adopts seems 
not much different from the one it purports to reject. 
Nevertheless, Stephen Morse has countered, characteristics like the 
defendant’s relative size and strength compared to that of the decedent, or the 
decedent’s prior history of violence, are “normal, non-culpable” characteristics 
that are properly considered in assessing a self-defense claim, whereas he 
suggests that the effects of battering “do not meet the test of normality and 
innocence for modifying the objective standard for justification.”62  If by 
“normality and innocence,” Morse is referring to the point he makes later that 
“not all victims of repeated battering are syndrome sufferers,”63 the standard 
for self-defense has always required only that the defendant’s belief in the need 
for defensive force be a “reasonable” one – not necessarily the correct one or 
one that everyone else in her situation would have endorsed.64  Just as some 
battered women do not strike back against their abusive partners, some 
individuals who are threatened by stronger aggressors submit to the assault, 
walk away, or otherwise manage to defuse the situation, and some who face an 
ambiguous situation do not mistakenly assume the other person poses a threat.  
Those who do exercise defensive force in these circumstances do not forfeit 
 
 60. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7-9 (Cal. 1996). 
 61. See id. at 9 (noting that the defendant’s history of abuse “was relevant to 
reasonableness,” as was “expert testimony about its effects” on her) (emphasis removed). 
 62. Morse, supra note 53, at 11.  This discussion obviously shades into the criticisms of 
battered woman syndrome theory discussed in the next section, but is included here because it 
directly implicates the objective inquiry made in self-defense cases. 
 63. Id.  For further discussion of this line of argument, see infra notes 190-95 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 5.7(c). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] SO MUCH ACTIVITY, SO LITTLE CHANGE 167 
 
their self-defense claim simply because “not all” persons in their situation 
would have done so. 
On the other hand, by “normality and innocence,” Morse may be referring 
to his argument that adopting “a reasonable battered victim syndrome sufferer” 
approach “makes a mockery of objective standards,” resulting in the 
“relativization of ethical standards” and “threaten[ing] to make right whatever 
the agent honestly believes is right.”65  It is obviously true, as George Fletcher 
has warned, that “[i]f the reasonable person were defined to be just like the 
defendant in every respect, he would arguably do exactly what the defendant 
did under the circumstances.”66  Thus, “if the reasonable person has all of the 
defender’s characteristics, the standard loses any normative component and 
becomes entirely subjective.”67  But, that is an inherent difficulty self-defense 
law confronts whenever it tries to determine which of the defendant’s 
characteristics are properly considered in making an objective inquiry: the 
perennial problem of “striking the balance between the defender’s subjective 
perceptions and those of the hypothetical reasonable person.”68 
Moreover, it is interesting to note, as Victoria Nourse has pointed out, that 
prior to 1960 the criminal law did not pay much attention to the precise 
definition of “the reasonable person.”69  Nevertheless, the purported neutrality 
of that unquestioned “reasonable person” standard masked the gender and race 
bias underlying it.70  Its assumption of a male model of behavior was implicit 
rather than express, therefore now “mak[ing] all other normative claimants 
appear illegitimate, as if they were political arguments asking for special 
favors.”71  Battered women, however, seek no “special favors.”  Even before 
commentators pointed out the biases hidden in the reasonable person standard, 
the objective element of self-defense was never purely objective; as noted 
above, it always included some of the defendant’s subjective characteristics.  
The only question then, as now, is the value judgment where we draw the 
line.72  
 
 65. Morse, supra note 53, at 13. 
 66. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 513 (1978). 
 67. Estrich, supra note 56, at 1435. 
 68. Id. at 1434. 
 69. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1296. 
 70. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, supra note 56, at 448 (observing that “[n]ot 
coincidentally, the allegedly universal, classless, and sexless nature of the reasonable man was a 
device which promoted the myth of the objective, value-free nature of the criminal law”). 
 71. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1299. 
 72. Some observers have commented on the ambiguity in self-defense law’s notion of 
“reasonableness” – whether it is a descriptive term (akin to “common” or “typical”) or a 
normative concept.  See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a 
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 495-96 (1996); Robert P. 
Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 503 
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Although the precise placement of that line may be open to debate, it 
should be beyond dispute that the effects of battering are relevant 
considerations.  As a Justice Department report commissioned by Congress 
recently concluded, “[a]n extensive and continually expanding research 
literature” – drawn from “the interdisciplinary fields of domestic violence and 
traumatic stress [and] reflect[ing] work in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, 
nursing, criminal justice, and other disciplines” – “supports the assertion that 
domestic violence is associated with a wide range of traumatic psychological 
reactions.”73  In fact, it was the recognition of this very fact that led courts to 
overcome their initial reluctance and admit expert testimony describing the 
battered woman syndrome in support of battered women’s self-defense 
claims.74  While this much may be conceded, battered woman syndrome theory 
has come under increasing attack from almost all sides.  It is to those criticisms 
that the next section turns. 
III.  BASHING THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Psychologist Lenore Walker, one of the early pioneers in the field of 
domestic violence, coined the term “battered woman syndrome” to describe the 
effects of intimate-partner abuse.75  In her 1979 book, The Battered Woman, 
Walker observed that women who find themselves in abusive relationships 
tend to share certain characteristics, including low self-esteem, passivity, and 
traditional attitudes about male-female roles.76  Walker also found that many 
battering relationships are characterized by a cyclical pattern – the so-called 
“cycle of violence,” consisting of a tension-building stage, an acute battering 
incident, and then a stage of loving contrition.77  The book also explained 
Walker’s theory of “learned helplessness”: once battered women learn that 
they cannot control or prevent the beatings, they come to feel that the violence 
is unavoidable and that there is no escape from the relationship.78  Walker used 
 
(1996).  This is an important observation, but it does not resolve the questions at issue here.  
Whether descriptive or normative, the reasonableness inquiry ought to carry the same 
connotations in all cases, and my point here is that battered women are asking only that their self-
defense claims be assessed according to the same reasonableness standards generally applied in 
other cases. 
 73. Mary Ann Dutton, Validity of “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Criminal Cases 
Involving Women, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO 
SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at 10, 4-5. 
 74. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
 75. WALKER, supra note 40, at xv. 
 76. See id. at 31-35. 
 77. See id. at 55-70 (finding that 65% of battered women reported a tension-building stage 
and 58% a contrition phase). 
 78. See id. at 45-54. 
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these findings to try to dispel the myth that battered women remain in abusive 
relationships because they are masochists.79  Instead, she pointed out that 
women stay for a number of reasons, which included not only their feelings of 
helplessness and the reinforcement they received during the third stage of the 
cycle, but also other factors – namely, fear, lack of resources, concern for 
children, love for their partner, shame, and lack of external support resulting 
from the batterer’s efforts to isolate them from others.80 
The “battered woman syndrome” has now become a popular punching bag, 
with the Justice Department report concluding that the term “does not reflect 
the breadth of empirical knowledge now available concerning battering and its 
effects” and thus “is no longer useful or appropriate.”81  Criticisms of the 
battered woman syndrome fall primarily into four categories: that the theory 
implies pathology or mental disorder rather than reasonableness; that it creates 
a new “battered woman syndrome” defense; that it suggests a model for all 
battering relationships that does not fit some women; and that the learned 
helplessness portion of the theory is inconsistent with a woman’s use of self-
defense.82  Each of these objections will be described in turn. 
 
 79. See id. at 20. 
 80. See WALKER, supra note 40, at 49-50, 64-69, 127-49. 
 81. Overview and Highlights of the Report, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND 
USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT 
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at vii 
(noting that this was “[a] significant conclusion of all three reports” included in the Justice 
Department report).  See also Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (characterizing the term “battered 
woman syndrome” as “imprecise” and “misleading,” and observing that it “does not adequately 
reflect the breadth or nature of knowledge concerning battering and its effects”); Mary Ann 
Dutton, Impact of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials Involving 
Women, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF 
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at 5 (finding a “consensus” in a focus 
group composed of judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, expert witnesses, and advocates that 
the term “battered woman syndrome” is “too ambiguous and too narrow” and therefore “not 
adequate to portray the necessary information to assist the factfinder” in a criminal trial involving 
a battered woman). 
 82. In addition to the four criticisms discussed here, some commentators have raised 
methodological objections to Walker’s study.  See, e.g.,  David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, 
The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 75-79, 104-07 
(1997); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and 
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 636-43 (1986).  Others have responded to these 
objections, noting the ethical considerations that make “true social science experiments” in this 
context impractical, see Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered 
Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 789, 797 (1996); the “virtual impossibility of conducting a controlled 
experiment,” Mosteller, supra note 72, at 481; the widespread use of surveys in other scientific 
research, see Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 55; and the fact that prior to Walker’s 
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First, critics of the theory argue that the term “syndrome” tends to 
“pathologize” battered women83 and thus, by definition, negates the 
reasonableness of their perceptions.84  Just as “the reasonable psychotic”85 or 
“the reasonable paranoid schizophrenic”86 is an oxymoron, the argument goes, 
so the “reasonable syndrome sufferer”87 cannot be deemed to have acted 
 
work, social scientists without her “ideological commitment” had “failed even to perceive 
violence against women as a problem worthy of study” and even “avowedly neutral scholars in 
this area turned out to have a political agenda of their own.”  Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: 
Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 92 
(1998). 
 83. Faigman & Wright, supra note 82, at 69.  See also Rebecca D. Cornia, Current Use of 
Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionalization of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 102 (1997); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52 
(1994) (describing the battered woman syndrome as “a mental disorder, whose characteristic 
symptoms cause [women] passively to submit themselves to marriages in which they are so 
brutally handled by dominant men that they lose their capacity to make rational choices”); 
Dutton, supra note 81, at 6 (reporting concerns expressed by the focus group that “the term 
‘battered woman syndrome’ signals disorder, pathology, or a clinical condition”); Patricia Kazan, 
Reasonableness, Gender Differences, and Self-Defense Law, 24 MANITOBA L.J. 549, 557 (1997) 
(noting that the battered woman syndrome makes women seem “deviant and pathological,” and 
“has often been read by the courts as evidence of mental incapacitation or insanity”); Margulies, 
supra note 82, at 96 (arguing that “the term ‘battered woman’ both pathologizes and homogenizes 
women’s experiences, leaving no room for agency”); Overview and Highlights of the Report, 
supra note 81, at vii (noting that “the word ‘syndrome’ may be misleading, by carrying 
connotations of pathology or disease, or . . . may create a false impression that the battered 
woman ‘suffers from’ a mental defect”). 
 84. For examples of court opinions describing the battered woman syndrome in medical 
terms that emphasize the woman’s incapacity and lack of reasonableness, see, e.g., Ex parte 
Haney, 603 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1992) (describing the defense expert as testifying that 
defendant “was suffering from a psychological defect, which he characterized as ‘spouse abuse 
syndrome’”); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 56 (Wash. 1994) (Utter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“battered woman syndrome describes a psychological condition produced when a person is 
repeatedly subjected to severe abuse,” and that “severe abuse distorts perceptions of harm and its 
immediacy in ways that are not readily understandable”); State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 533 n.11 
(W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (commenting that the defendant “relied upon the battered woman’s 
syndrome and other evidence of mental incapacity and upon self-defense as a defense at trial”) 
(emphasis added); Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 10 (Wyo. 2000) (observing, in analyzing whether the 
prosecution was entitled to notes taken by defense expert who examined the defendant for 
battered woman syndrome, that the defendant – whose defense at trial was self-defense – 
“asserted an affirmative defense on the basis of diminished capacity and battered woman 
syndrome” and therefore “may not argue a deficient mental condition and, at the same time, claim 
protection by privilege”). 
 85. Kazan, supra note 83, at 563. 
 86. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not 
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 242 (2002).  See also Morse, supra 
note 53, at 13. 
 87. Morse, supra note 53, at 12. 
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reasonably and thus cannot possibly hope to satisfy the objective component of 
the self-defense standard.  This criticism is not entirely fair because the 
“battered woman syndrome” construct is not necessarily meant to connote 
some sort of mental disease or defect, but is simply “a convenient way of 
describing a set of characteristics that are common to many (but not all) 
battered women.”88  Nevertheless, the use of the term “syndrome” has clinical 
connotations and is therefore prone to generate confusion.  
Second, critics have argued that the battered woman syndrome creates a 
new “battered woman syndrome defense” – a “special excuse for women.”89  
But, the “syndrome” itself does not give rise to a defense.90  Rather, the history 
 
 88. Parrish, supra note 41, at 2.  See also Kazan, supra note 83, at 557 (observing that the 
battered woman syndrome was “originally intended to function in a purely descriptive 
capacity . . . making it possible for the courts to see past common myths and misconceptions 
about the battering relationship”); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered 
Women Who Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony, 20 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 167, 168 (1996) (observing that battered woman syndrome is “merely a descriptive 
term”); Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Law, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1170, 1177 (1993) (noting 
that the battered woman syndrome, like post-traumatic stress disorder, is “not a mental illness, but 
rather a way to clinically describe the impact of abuse on the woman’s state of mind”). 
  Some courts have recognized as much, noting that the “battered woman syndrome” is 
not a mental disease.  See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996) (using the 
term “battered women’s syndrome,” but observing that “‘the preferred term among many experts 
today is “expert testimony on battering and its effects” or “expert testimony on battered women’s 
experiences,’”” in part because “‘the phrase “battered women’s syndrome” . . . has pathological 
connotations which suggest that battered women suffer from some sort of sickness [and] expert 
testimony on domestic violence refers to more than women’s psychological reactions to 
violence’”) (quoting amicus brief); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) 
(noting that “Battered Woman Syndrome is not a mental defect or disease,” but rather “is 
identified by a series of common characteristics that appear in persons who have been abused for 
an extended period of time by the dominant figure in their lives”); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (concluding that “the syndrome is a mixture of both psychological and 
physiological symptoms but is not a mental disease in the context of insanity”). 
 89. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 27-28.  See also Morse, supra note 53, at 3 (describing the 
“battered victim” defense as a “new affirmative defense[]”). 
 90. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (observing that “[t]here is no ‘battered woman 
defense,’ per se”).  A number of courts seem to have had no trouble recognizing this fact.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822 (Ga. 1997) (observing that “the battered person 
syndrome is not a separate defense, but . . . evidence of battered person syndrome is relevant in a 
proper case as a component of justifiable homicide by self-defense”); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 
1249, 1253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that state statute providing for admissibility of 
battered spouse syndrome evidence “does not, as appellant, the State, and the trial judge all seem 
to believe, create a new defense to murder”; “[r]ather, evidence of the Battered Spouse Syndrome 
is offered in support of the state of mind element of perfect or imperfect self-defense”); Boykins 
v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 478 (Nev. 2000) (noting that “battered woman syndrome is not a complete 
defense” but is “relevant to the reasonableness of an individual’s belief that death or great bodily 
harm is imminent”); Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (commenting that “Battered Woman Syndrome 
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of violence and the effects of that violence are used in determining whether the 
defendant has a standard self-defense claim because she acted under 
circumstances where she honestly and reasonably believed she was in 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.  Nevertheless, some courts 
and commentators persist in using the misleading terms “battered woman’s 
defense” and “battered woman syndrome defense,” even when they are talking 
about standard self-defense claims.91 
Third, critics point out that Walker’s theory creates a one-size-fits-all 
model that in fact does not accurately describe all abusive relationships.92  The 
battered women who actively take steps in an effort to stem the abuse – 
sometimes even fighting back – can hardly be viewed as “passive” or 
“helpless.”  Not only does this model tend to create a profile or stereotype that 
each battered woman must meet in order to raise a successful self-defense 
claim,93 it also disproportionately disadvantages certain groups of women – 
 
is not a defense to a criminal act,” but instead is “evidence . . . generally recognized as admissible 
in cases involving self-defense”); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (warning that 
“admission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new 
defense or justification,” but “assist[s] the trier of fact [in] determin[ing] whether the defendant 
acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and 
that the use of such force was her only means of escape”); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 
1986) (admonishing that “this Court is not recognizing the battered woman’s syndrome as a 
separate defense” but is only addressing “the relevance of this testimony to a claim of self-
defense”); Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995) (noting that state statute permitting the 
use of battered woman syndrome testimony “does not create a separate defense; it permits the 
introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome when the affirmative defense 
of self-defense is raised”). 
 91. See Parrish, supra note 41, at iii (noting that “the perception that there is a separate 
defense called the ‘battered women’s defense,’ or the ‘battered woman syndrome defense,’ 
persists” among many judges and lawyers).  See also supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 92. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (arguing that “[t]he knowledge pertaining to 
battering and its effects does not rest on a singular construct, as the term ‘battered women 
syndrome’ implies”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 71 (observing that the battered woman 
syndrome “homogenize[s] women’s experiences” and does not fit those who “consistently reply 
in kind”); Raeder, supra note 82, at 790 (noting that admissibility of battered woman syndrome 
evidence “depends upon shoehorning women into a syndrome in which they often do not fit”). 
 93. See, e.g., Faigman & Wright, supra note 82, at 111 (noting that courts may refuse to 
admit expert testimony when a defendant “fails to ‘fit’ the ‘typical’ model of a battered woman 
who kills”); Maguigan, supra note 7, at 444-45 (arguing that a “reasonable battered woman” 
standard creates “a new stereotype” and “invites courts to prevent the fair trials of women who 
are not ‘good’ battered women”); Martha Shaffer, The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: 
Some Complicating Thoughts Five Years After R. v. Lavallee, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 19 (1997) 
(concluding that the Canadian experience with battered woman syndrome testimony “raise[s] the 
possibility that a stereotype of the ‘authentic’ battered woman is operating, making it difficult for 
women who do not fit the mold to make use of self-defence”). 
  Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000), provides a helpful illustration of the dangers 
resulting from the creation of such a model.  The dissenting opinion in that case pointed out: 
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including women of color94 and women who are financially independent95 – 
whom juries are less likely to regard as “helpless.”  Moreover, it is a model 
that contributes to gender stereotypes by favoring helplessness and passivity, 
thereby rewarding women who act in conformance with traditional gender 
roles.96  It is thus, according to Anne Coughlin, a “profoundly anti-feminist,” 
indeed “misogynist,” defense.97 
 
The jury apparently favored the testimony of the State’s expert . . . that Boykins did not fit 
the typical profile of a battered woman.  For example, Boykins successfully managed a 
brothel with dozens of employees, she was financially independent, and earned 
approximately $65,000 annually for her work at the brothel.  Moreover, Boykins had 
previously exhibited aggressive and dominant personality characteristics. 
Id. at 481 (Young, J., dissenting). 
 94. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 19, at 1071 (observing that an African-American woman 
“must compete with racial and cultural stereotypes that indicate that she is anything but 
‘helpless’”); Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 
1250 (2001) (criticizing battered woman syndrome theory because it is “based upon the white, 
middle class woman” and fails to “consider or accommodate other sources of oppression,” for 
example, the hesitancy of African-American women to call the police and the “silenc[ing of 
Asian-American women] from reporting their abuse by the community pressures and family 
values of their ethnicity”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 71 (pointing out that learned helplessness 
“conflicts with popular images of African-American women”).  See generally Pamela J. Smith, 
Comment, We Are Not Sisters: African-American Women and the Freedom to Associate and 
Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467, 1482 (1992) (observing that historically it was only white 
women who were put on a pedestal and “expected to be submissive”). 
 95. See Ammons, supra note 19, at 1078 n.259 (observing that “jurors have to be educated 
about how a black woman can be economically independent and yet emotionally dependent or 
‘trapped’ in a relationship”).  See generally S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37 (1990) (concluding that 
domestic violence is not confined to a particular socio-economic group). 
 96. See, e.g., Cornia, supra note 83, at 101, 122 (describing the battered woman syndrome as 
an “immense disservice” because it “sacrifice[s] an emerging image of woman as equal to man” 
and “reinforces incapacity and inferiority in the women who invoke it”); Coughlin, supra note 83, 
at 50-51 (arguing that the defense “excuses [a battered woman] from criminal liability if she can 
prove that she was a passive, obedient wife whose choices were determined, not by her own 
exercise of will, but by the superior will of her husband,” and thus “requires women to embrace 
precisely the same insulting stereotypes the defense was supposed to explode”); Faigman & 
Wright, supra note 82, at 69-70 (commenting that the battered woman syndrome reflects “archaic 
stereotypes” and “demeans women”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 64-65 (concluding that the 
battered woman syndrome “subtly harms all women by reinforcing images of helplessness and 
lack of agency,” thereby suggesting that the “images that have historically limited opportunities 
for women . . . reflect an inevitable and natural reality rather than a social construction”); Morse, 
supra note 53, at 13 (observing that the battered woman syndrome may “reinforce[] negative 
stereotypes of women as helpless victims of their emotions who cannot be expected to behave 
rationally”). 
 97. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 87, 70.  Professor Coughlin analogizes the “battered woman 
syndrome defense” to the now-discredited marital coercion doctrine, pursuant to which a woman 
who committed a crime in her husband’s presence was presumed to have been coerced to do so.  
See id. at 31.  Coughlin contends that “the marital coercion doctrine reappeared, with its 
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Finally, critics make the related point that the theory of “learned 
helplessness” cannot account for a battered woman’s use of defensive force.  
Christine Littleton has commented on “[t]he tension . . . between [the] image 
of battered women as passive and the actual action of those relatively few 
battered women who kill their batterers.”98  As George Fletcher succinctly 
noted, “[i]t is hardly a sign of helplessness to acquire a gun and . . . kill one’s 
psychological captor.”99 
Despite the force of some of these criticisms – particularly the last two – it 
is important to note that psychological research into the effects of abuse has 
advanced since the publication of Walker’s book in 1979.  Walker herself, as 
well as others, have observed that a history of abuse triggers in some battered 
women a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),100 an anxiety 
disorder that, according to the American Psychiatric Association, results from 
“exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor” that involves experiencing or 
witnessing a threat of death or serious injury to oneself or others.101  Common 
signs of PTSD are found in some battered women: reliving the traumatic event 
in flashbacks or dreams; avoidance (or “flight”) behavior, such as an inability 
to recall the traumatic event, a “restricted range of affect,” or efforts to avoid 
situations that trigger memories of the event; and arousal (or “fight”) 
symptoms, such as hypervigilance, irritability, or sleep disorders.102 
 
patriarchal understandings about women’s incapacity for responsible conduct virtually intact, . . . 
in the form of the battered woman syndrome defense.”  Id. at 48-49. 
 98. Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives 
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 29, 30 (also posing the question, “If 
these women are so passive, dependent and helpless, where do they get the strength and courage 
to live, day after day, with the abuse, humiliation and violence . . . [a]nd, in those rare instances, 
where do they get the desperation to kill?”). 
 99. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL 
TRIALS 138 (1995).  See also Coughlin, supra note 83, at 81 (arguing that “the learned 
helplessness diagnosis . . . is inconsistent with the homicidal act” because “[i]f the woman is 
psychologically paralyzed, . . . then it seems much more likely that she will continue to endure 
the ongoing violence, rather than resort to such an extreme form of self-help”); Estrich, supra 
note 56, at 1433 (noting that women who kill “are, by definition, hardly . . . ‘helpless’ creatures”); 
Kazan, supra note 83, at 567, 568 (arguing that learned helplessness “undermines [the battered 
woman’s] claim” and makes it “difficult to imagine how [she] might be able to summon the will 
to act in her own defense”). 
 100. Walker, supra note 88, at 1177, 1185.  See Dutton, supra note 73, at 19 (noting that 
PTSD can be found in somewhere between 31% and 84% of battered women).  See also WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(a) (Michie 2003) (defining battered woman syndrome as a “subset” of 
PTSD); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (describing battered 
woman syndrome as “a subcategory or subset of posttraumatic stress syndrome”). 
 101. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994). 
 102. See id. at 426-28. 
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Although PTSD can develop in “almost anyone” exposed to such a 
stressor,103 some critics respond that PTSD, like the battered woman syndrome, 
is a mental disorder that, by definition, signifies the absence of reasonableness 
and therefore cannot possibly support a self-defense claim.104  Even if it is “a 
normal response to an abnormally stressful situation,” several commentators 
have written, it remains a “psychological disorder[] because the individual 
suffers a recognizable pattern of impaired psychological process.”105  The 
“normalcy” of the syndrome may help to “explain[] the situational source of 
the disorder,” they continue, but it “does not render the syndrome less a 
disorder.”106 
By way of comparison, however, the criminal law does not blindly 
embrace medical diagnoses of mental disease when it comes to the insanity 
defense.  In that context, the law has always taken the position that the medical 
and legal definitions of mental disease are not necessarily identical because the 
two communities have distinct goals and purposes.107  Similarly here, the fact 
that a defendant has a diagnosable mental condition according to the medical 
profession should not automatically foreclose a self-defense claim or a finding 
of reasonableness.  The fundamental question for the criminal justice system 
should be whether in the particular case the symptoms of that condition 
distorted or supported the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear.  With respect 
to PTSD, some symptoms – for example, hypervigilance – may well suggest 
the reasonableness of a defendant’s fear because they make her more alert to 
signals of danger.108  Other symptoms – for example, lack of affect or 
difficulty remembering the abuse – are neutral and not directly relevant to the 
reasonableness of her beliefs at the time she used defensive force.109  And still 
others, for example, a flashback that “magnifie[d] the fear and cause[d] the 
 
 103. Id. at 426. 
 104. See Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 95-96.  Cf. Mary Ann Dutton, 
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1198-99 (1993) (observing that “defining battered woman 
syndrome as PTSD frames the issue before the finder of fact as solely a ‘clinical’ phenomena,” 
requiring the battered woman “to meet a specific set of criteria,” and therefore risking “the 
unintended result . . . that the expert witness constructs for the finder of fact an image of 
pathology”). 
 105. Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 95. 
 106. Id. at 96 (acknowledging that they would reach a different conclusion if the term 
“normal” in this context signified “free of functional impairment” – as opposed to “statistically 
normal” or “understandable” – but concluding that would be “incompatible with the contention 
that the battered woman syndrome occurs at all, because the syndrome has been defined as a 
pattern of psychological impairment which typically occurs in battered women”). 
 107. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 4.3(c)(2). 
 108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 109. See id. 
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woman to perceive each successive battering incident as more dangerous than 
if it were the first one to occur” – if that perception was unreasonable – will 
undermine a self-defense claim by suggesting that her belief in the need to use 
defensive force was not reasonable.110  Thus, the fact that PTSD – or even the 
much-maligned battered woman syndrome111 – may have psychological 
sequelae does not mean that battered women’s self-defense claims are 
tantamount to a “reasonable psychotic”112 or “reasonable paranoid 
schizophrenic”113 standard of self-defense. 
In addition to evidence of PTSD, other experts have found that the so-
called “active survivor theory” better captures the experience of battered 
women.114  This theory, associated with Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher, 
observes that, rather than being helpless, battered women “respond to abuse 
with helpseeking efforts that are largely unmet,” and they “remain in abusive 
situations not because they have been passive but because they have tried to 
escape with no avail.”115  Moreover, women tend to step up their helpseeking 
efforts as the violence escalates, “attempting, in a very logical fashion, to 
assure themselves and their children protection and therefore survival.”116  
Gondolf and Fisher also explain that “[t]he so-called symptoms of learned 
helplessness may in fact be part of the adjustment to active helpseeking,” 
 
 110. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Is a Psychological Consequence of 
Abuse, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 133, 138-44 (Richard J. Gelles & 
D.R. Loseke eds., 1993). 
 111. But cf. Ammons, supra note 19, at 1080 (commenting that “it seems premature and 
cavalier to jettison a trauma theory which is akin to other valid explanations of how humans 
respond to violence, just because it might not apply to all battered women”). 
 112. Kazan, supra note 83, at 563. 
 113. Burke, supra note 86, at 242. 
 114. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11-25 (1988).  See also Dutton, supra 
note 73, at 15-16 (citing studies reporting that “many battered women engage in active efforts to 
resist, avoid, escape, and stop the violence against them,” including fighting back physically and 
verbally and calling the police); Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar & Rene Ellis, The Culture of 
Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 146 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2135-
36 (1993) (concluding that battered women tend to increase their helpseeking efforts over time, 
rather than becoming passive and decreasing such efforts); Littleton, supra note 98, at 41-42 
(observing that learned helplessness theory is “markedly inconsistent with Walker’s own 
description of a ‘common behavior’ among the battered women she studied” – that they actively 
engage in efforts “‘to control other people and events in the environment to keep the batterer from 
losing his temper’” and also “‘develop survival or coping skills that keep them alive with minimal 
injuries’”) (quoting WALKER, supra note 40, at 34; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME 33 (1984)); Mahoney, supra note 21, at 61-62 (noting that many battered 
women seek help or try to leave the abusive relationship, and concluding that it is “the helping 
professions, rather than battered women, that [are] afflicted with ‘helplessness’”). 
 115. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 114, at 11, 17. 
 116. Id. at 18. 
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attributable to “quite natural and healthy responses”: learned helplessness may, 
for example, reflect “a temporary manifestation of traumatic shock, . . . an 
effort by battered women to save the relationship,” or “an expression of 
separation anxiety that understandably accompanies leaving the batterer.”117 
The active survivor theory thus “focuses on abusers and on societal 
inaction, not on the incapacities of survivors, . . . stress[ing] the power and 
control exerted by the abuser, the enforcement of that power by both legal and 
cultural norms, and the material, rather than psychological, deficits that make 
exiting abusive relationships difficult.”118  In addition to emphasizing the 
reasonableness of the battered woman’s actions, this model avoids falling into 
the trap of focusing exclusively on the woman and her psychological traits, 
thereby diverting attention from the role that the abuser, society, and other 
external constraints play in preventing her from protecting herself and leaving 
the relationship.119  Moreover, the active survivor theory is “inclusive” and 
“open[] to a diverse spectrum of stories,” “instead of relying . . . on an expert’s 
monolithic construct of a woman’s subjective mental state.”120  In this respect, 
the active survivor theory is consistent with the finding of researchers 
generally that not all battered women respond in the same way to a history of 
abuse.121 
As a result of these developments in our understanding of abusive 
relationships, many researchers, expert witnesses, and judges now talk in terms 
of “battering and its effects” rather than “the battered woman syndrome.”122  
This terminology is intended to minimize the confusion generated by the term 
 
 117. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis removed). 
 118. Margulies, supra note 82, at 113. 
 119. See Chiu, supra note 94, at 1251-52 (noting that the “lopsided focus on . . . the behavior 
of the woman distracts and undermines the need to further explore and understand the 
blameworthy and egregious conduct of the man,” thereby representing a “contemporary version[] 
of the historical blaming of women for domestic violence”); Dutton, supra note 104, at 1201 
(concluding that “expert testimony concerning battered women’s experiences” provides the 
“overall social context that is essential for explaining battered women’s responses to violence”); 
Susan Stefan, The Cloak of Benevolence, in MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN & 
MORRISON TORREY, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 322, 324 (2d ed. 
2001) (pointing out that “[b]y labeling a reaction to . . . battering . . . as a medical condition to be 
treated, it is more likely to be removed from the political sphere – seen as an individual’s medical 
condition and not a focal point for political action”). 
 120. Margulies, supra note 82, at 111. 
 121. See Dutton, supra note 104, at 1196; Overview and Highlights of the Report, supra note 
81, at vii-viii.  Note that even Lenore Walker found that the three-stage cycle of violence did not 
describe all battering relationships.  See supra note 77. 
 122. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996) (observing that “‘the 
preferred term among many experts today is “expert testimony on battering and its effects” or 
“expert testimony on battered women’s experiences’””) (quoting amicus brief); Dutton, supra 
note 73, at 22; Dutton, supra note 81, at 6. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
178 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
 
“battered woman syndrome” by avoiding any suggestion that the woman 
suffers from a “syndrome” or mental impairment or that some sort of profile or 
model exists that all battered women must match.123 
Nevertheless, some critics persist in arguing that even testimony describing 
the active survivor theory or the “effects” of battering creates a “special 
excuse[] for women” – one that is “not available to all” defendants but instead 
is “designed . . . to provide new excuses for women defendants only.”124  And, 
the argument continues, “special excuses for women, in whatever form, 
reinforce incommensurable gender differences, in which the qualities 
characterized as male inevitably are privileged over those characterized as 
female.”125 
For a battered woman facing murder charges, however, often the major 
hurdle is convincing the judge “to apply the generally applicable standards of 
self-defense jurisprudence” to her case – a hurdle that frequently proves 
difficult because judges are simply unable “to see battered women’s use of 
deadly force as reasonable under established definitions.”126  Battered women 
 
 123. It is not evident, however, that any such change in the tenor of expert testimony will 
have much impact on the outcome of battered women’s trials.  See Schuller & Hastings, supra 
note 88, at 181-84 (concluding based on simulated trial experiment that the gender of the juror 
made a difference, but that the type of expert testimony did not have much effect on the verdict).  
See generally CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-
DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 41-43 (1987) (reporting results of various studies, most of 
which found that approximately two-thirds or three-fourths of battered women are convicted or 
plead guilty); Parrish, supra note 41, at 7 (concluding based on survey of state court opinions that 
“the defense’s use of or the court’s awareness of expert testimony on battering and its effects in 
no way equates to an acquittal”); Shaffer, supra note 93, at 17-19 (reporting, based on five-year 
survey of thirty-five Canadian cases in which the battered woman syndrome was raised as a part 
of a defense or as a mitigating factor in sentencing, that the Canadian experience belies the 
argument that “women charged with killing their batterers are securing acquittals in great 
numbers”). 
 124. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 91, 26. 
 125. Id. at 91, 90 (concluding, however, that the active survivor theory is “less misogynist 
than . . . learned helplessness”). 
 126. Maguigan, supra note 7, at 432-37 (attributing the high reversal rate she found in 
surveying 270 appellate court opinions issued in 223 battered women’s homicide cases – a rate of 
40%, compared to the national average of 8.5% – to this factor).  See also Parrish, supra note 41, 
at 7 (finding a reversal rate of 32% in survey of 152 state court decisions involving battered 
women). 
  For recent cases illustrating Maguigan’s theory, see People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 347-
49 (Colo. 2001) (reversing defendant’s conviction in part because the trial judge refused to 
instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat and that deadly force can be used to prevent 
sexual assault); Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057-58 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that the trial 
court erred by excluding testimony of three eyewitnesses who “would have provided the only 
direct testimony to support Weiand’s claims of prior abuse,” thus allowing the prosecutor to 
“discredit Weiand’s claims of abuse by arguing that no one had ever witnessed any injuries on 
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do not seek “special” treatment; they simply ask to be judged by the same rules 
that have traditionally been applied to male defendants.  Their request to have 
the finder of fact consider the effects of battering may look like a request for 
special treatment, but that is only because we are so accustomed to making the 
same sort of inquiries in cases involving male defendants that they have now 
become invisible to us.  As Victoria Nourse has pointed out, “group 
generalizations are unavoidable in the criminal law.”127  For example, she 
notes, “[w]hen juries generalize that men naturally lose control when their 
wives cheat . . . , they are making group generalizations.”128  To be sure, men 
do not rely on a “male rejection syndrome” in those cases; they do not “call 
expert witnesses to explain that a reasonable person would lose self-control 
when his wife cheats or leaves.”129  But, that is only because they need not do 
so, for “the reasonableness of such arguments is assumed.”130  The reason such 
conduct is presumed reasonable with no need for explanation, whereas the 
conduct of a battered woman is presumed to be unreasonable, and any request 
for explanation is dismissed as special pleading, is because the criminal law 
“is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with male concerns and male 
perspectives, . . . a system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men, 
and against men.”131 
To the extent the argument is that even the erroneous misperception that 
battered women are seeking special treatment reinforces gender stereotypes, 
this critique is reminiscent of the familiar equal treatment/different treatment 
debate that has raged in feminist jurisprudence.132  Advocates of equal 
treatment contend that treating female defendants differently from male 
 
Weiand or seen evidence of her husband’s abuse of her”); State v. Rodrigue, 734 So. 2d 608, 612 
(La. 1999) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to apply state statute allowing testimony 
of batterer’s prior violence because the parties were not involved in “a current intimate 
relationship,” even though “[t]he statute . . . contain[ed] no such requirement” and “certainly did 
not contemplate that the battered party would not have the benefit of the provision when the 
batterer, as frequently happens, confronts and assaults the former mate shortly after the break-up 
of the intimate relationship”). 
 127. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1443. 
 128. Id. at 1443-44 (also explaining that “any time the law imposes a reasonable person 
standard, it requires that juries make assumptions about human behavior – assumptions that put 
the defendant in a group of analogously situated persons”). 
 129. Id. at 1451. 
 130. Id.  For further discussion of these provocation issues, see infra notes 174, 192-94, and 
accompanying text. 
 131. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151, 2151, 2154 (1995). 
 132. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 
(1994). 
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defendants reinforces gender stereotypes.133  Difference feminists point out in 
response that the quest for formal equality presumes the absence of gender 
differences and that, in a male-dominated society which invariably “privileges” 
those “qualities characterized as male,” settling for formal equality tends to 
disadvantage women.134  The controversy here is yet another manifestation of 
what Margaret Radin has called “the transition problem of the double bind” –  
“a series of two-pronged dilemmas in which both prongs are, or can be, losers 
for the oppressed.”135  Given the Catch-22 nature of this dilemma, there is, of 
course, no perfect solution.  To me, however, it seems preferable to take into 
account the effects of battering in assessing a battered woman’s self-defense 
claim, not only because doing so will permit a more accurate and more 
complete – and therefore fairer – assessment of her situation, but also because 
otherwise we disadvantage her compared to male defendants for whom the 
criminal justice system has historically, though perhaps unconsciously, been 
willing to make such accommodations. 
IV.  THE IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT 
Focusing on self-defense’s imminence requirement, some critics argue that 
a battered woman who kills under non-confrontational circumstances might 
reasonably fear future abuse,136 but she cannot honestly and reasonably believe 
she is in imminent danger of harm at the time she acts.137  There are four 
responses to this objection. 
 
 133. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-52 (1984-
1985) (arguing that “the ‘equal treatment’ approach to pregnancy . . . is the one best able to 
reduce structural barriers to full workforce participation of women, produce just results for 
individuals, and support a more egalitarian social structure”). 
 134. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity 
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1181 (1986) (characterizing the equal 
treatment approach as “fundamentally flawed” because “[t]he search for sameness is built around 
male norms” and therefore only helps women who “are just like men, or are willing to ascribe to 
male values and standards”). 
 135. Margaret Ann Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1699, 
1701, 1704 (1990) (noting that the double bind is a “pervasive” problem for women because 
“[f]or a group subject to structures of domination, all roads thought to be progressive can pack a 
backlash”). 
 136. But cf. Danielle R. Dubin, Note, A Woman’s Cry for Help: Why the United States Should 
Apply Germany’s Model of Self-Defense for the Battered Woman, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
235, 241 (1995) (contending that it is “legally impossible to conclusively establish” that a 
sleeping batterer will resume the abuse when he awakes). 
 137. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 56, at 1433 (commenting that the imminence requirement 
“does not allow [a battered woman] to respond eight hours later, or when [the abuser] is asleep”); 
Kym C. Miller, Abused Women Abused by the Law: The Plight of Battered Women in California 
and a Proposal for Revising the California Self-Defense Law, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S 
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First, research shows that battered women tend to become hypersensitive 
to their abuser’s behavior and to the signs that predict a beating.138  Many 
battered women who kill say that something in the abuser’s behavior changed 
or signaled to them that this time he really was serious about carrying out his 
threats to kill.139  That experience may enable battered women to recognize the 
imminence of an attack at a time when others without their prior experience 
would not. 
Second, given her history, a battered woman may reasonably come to 
believe that the only time she can realistically protect herself is when her 
abuser is, for example, asleep.  She may have learned that trying to defend 
herself during a beating is futile and merely escalates the violence.140  She may 
have tried numerous other ways of protecting herself and escaping the 
relationship, only to find that the criminal justice system and social service 
agencies were unable or unwilling to help her and that her husband would find 
her, bring her back, and punish her with even more severe abuse for attempting 
to leave him.141  In fact, research shows that battered women are often attacked 
 
STUD. 303, 316 (1994) (arguing that, given the imminence requirement, “a jury can only find that 
the woman acted in self-defense by disregarding the mandate of . . . self-defense law”); Richard 
A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
371, 375 (1993) (concluding that the refusal even to instruct the jury on self-defense in a case 
where a battered woman shot her sleeping husband was consistent with “settled [self-defense] 
law” because “the threat of death or great bodily harm was not imminent when [she] shot her 
husband, not, at least, by any reasonable interpretation of the word imminent”); Dubin, supra note 
136, at 240 (arguing that the courts’ interpretation of the imminence requirement “effectively 
excludes” self-defense in non-confrontational cases).  See also infra note 147 and accompanying 
text. 
 138. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 8 (observing that “intimate partners generally learn to 
read the subtle nuances of each other’s behavior more clearly than can others”); Fischer, Vidmar 
& Ellis, supra note 114, at 2119-20 (reporting that, just as “[t]hrough daily interaction and shared 
history every couple develops idiosyncratic modes of communication, . . . [a] gesture that seems 
innocent to an observer is instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of 
abuse”); Morse, supra note 53, at 11-12 (noting that hypervigilance would be helpful to show the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s perception of danger); Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, 
at 72 (observing that “the best indicators of future violence are past violent behavior by the same 
person in similar circumstances”).  See also supra note 102 and accompanying text (reporting that 
hypervigilance is one of the effects of PTSD). 
 139. See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 13, at 129-30. 
 140. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 16.  Moreover, a woman who tries to protect herself 
by hiding a weapon to use when the batterer resumes his attack may be deemed to have acted 
with premeditation and thus convicted of first-degree murder. 
 141. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 145 (concluding that “Judy Norman could not 
escape without fear of being caught and beaten, as she had been beaten in the past”); Schopp, 
Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 104 (observing that battered women who unsuccessfully 
tried to seek help “can cogently argue that effective legal alternatives were not available,” and 
others “might demonstrate the necessity of defensive force through expert testimony regarding 
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and even killed when they try to leave the relationship and the batterer fears 
that he is losing control.142 
Third, even though “inevitable future harm” may not be the same as 
“imminent harm,”143 imminence is in some sense a proxy for necessity.144  The 
 
the lack of effective legal protection in their jurisdiction”).  For a general discussion of the 
inadequacy of current legal remedies and the “helplessness” of social agencies in addressing the 
needs of battered women, see supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text. 
 142.  
At least half of women who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further 
attacked by them.  In one study of interspousal homicide, more than half of the men who 
killed their spouses did so when the partners were separated; in contrast, less than ten 
percent of women who killed were separated at the time . . . .  Men who kill their wives 
described their feeling of loss of control over the woman as a primary factor . . . .  “[T]he 
decision by a battered woman to leave is often met with escalated violence by the 
batterer.” 
Mahoney, supra note 21, at 64-65 (quoting Barbara Hart, Beyond the “Duty to Warn”: A 
Therapist’s “Duty to Protect” Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
WIFE ABUSE 234, 240 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (alteration in original)).  See 
also Dutton, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that the phenomenon of “separation abuse – retaliation 
for a woman’s efforts to separate from the abuser or to end the relationship” – is “validated . . . by 
homicide statistics”); Fischer, Vidmar & Ellis, supra note 114, at 2138 (reporting that “[t]he most 
dangerous time for a battered woman is when she separates from her partner”); Miller, supra note 
137, at 308 (reporting that three-fourths of battered women are beaten after they are separated or 
divorced) (citing CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, CRIME PREVENTION CENTER, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HANDBOOK: A VICTIM’S GUIDE 3 (1988)). 
 143. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989) (holding that “a defendant’s subjective 
belief of what might be ‘inevitable’ at some indefinite point in the future does not equate to what 
she believes to be ‘imminent’”). 
 144. See FLETCHER, supra note 66, §10.5; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 
131(c)(1)-(2) (1984); Burke, supra note 86, at 278 (observing that “[a]s a factor acting 
independent of necessity, the imminency of the threat has no exculpatory value to a claim of self-
defense”); Rosen, supra note 137, at 380 (noting that “the concept of imminence has no 
significance independent of the notion of necessity”); Lawrence P. Tiffany & Carl A. Anderson, 
Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DENV. L. J. 839, 846-47 (1975) (pointing 
out that the “temporal ‘imminence’ of the threat may be . . . evidence of a lack of alternatives, but 
the absence of temporal ‘imminence’ is not proof of the existence of alternatives”).  See also 
Nourse, supra note 7, at 1259 n.117 (citing cases that “explicitly equate imminence and 
alternatives”).  Cf. Queen v. Petel, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3, 13-14 (Can.) (noting that Canadian self-
defense law considers imminence “only one of the factors which the jury should weigh in 
determining whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension of danger and a reasonable belief 
that she could not extricate herself otherwise than by killing the attacker”). 
  In fact, Professor Rosen has pointed out that historically, “imminence of impending 
harm was not a specific requirement” of either of the two forerunners of our contemporary self-
defense defense, and he therefore concludes that imminence does not have “an unquestioned 
historical lineage as a fundamental requirement for a finding of self-defense.”  Rosen, supra note 
137, at 382, 387.  Rosen therefore advocates that the imminence requirement be relaxed such that 
if a defendant satisfies the burden of production by presenting substantial evidence that defensive 
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battered woman who kills her sleeping husband arguably satisfies that notion 
of imminence, just like the hostage who is being slowly poisoned over a period 
of time, or who has been told to expect to die later in the week, and who 
suddenly has a window of opportunity to attack her kidnapper and save her 
life.145 
Finally, it is important to note that standard self-defense doctrine requires 
only a reasonable belief in the imminence of the threat, and not actual 
imminence.  As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals observed, “the issue 
is not whether the danger was in fact imminent, but whether, given the 
circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s belief was reasonable 
that the danger was imminent.”146 
Nevertheless, some critics counter, the imminence requirement cannot be 
satisfied in non-confrontational cases because the woman always had the 
option of leaving before the abuser woke up.147  In addition to the difficulties 
 
force was necessary to defend against a non-imminent threat, the jury would be instructed to 
consider only whether self-defense was necessary, with imminence being one relevant factor but 
not an absolute prerequisite.  See id. at 405-06. 
 145. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (analogizing the battered 
woman’s situation to “the classic hostage situation”); Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C. 
1992) (concluding that “[w]here torture appears interminable and escape impossible, the belief 
that only the death of the batterer can provide relief may be reasonable in the mind of a person of 
ordinary firmness”); ROBINSON, supra note 144, § 131(c)(1) (posing a similar hypothetical and 
concluding that “[i]f a threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim 
waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier – as early 
as is required to defend himself effectively”). 
 146. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12.  See also Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997); 
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 453-54 (Ky. 1999). 
 147. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 28-29 n.12 (1994) (arguing that 
“[n]owhere in the civilized world do self-defense laws justify the killing or maiming of a sleeping 
spouse by a woman who has the option of either leaving or calling the police”); FLETCHER, supra 
note 99, at 134-35 (observing that a woman who kills a sleeping batterer has “a problem 
justifying the killing as the fear of imminent attack” and the “further problem . . . that she [has] to 
explain why she did not seize a less extreme means of avoiding [his] brutality – namely, running 
away”).  Cf. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999) (noting that the prosecutor in 
that case – which involved a killing “during a violent argument,” not under non-confrontational 
circumstances – “stressed as ‘critical’ that the killing could not be considered justifiable homicide 
unless Weiand had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, including fleeing her 
home”). 
  These failure-to-exhaust-all-options arguments are reminiscent of those made in some 
sexual assault cases, where women are asked why they did not scream, fight back, or use some 
other means to escape a violent man.  See, e.g., People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 593-94 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that “it was incumbent upon [the woman] to resist,” and noting that a 
5’2”, 105-pound woman attacked in the middle of an isolated woods by a 6’3”, 185-pound man 
did not scream, try to flee, or “tell [him] to leave her alone or put her down”); State v. Rusk, 424 
A.2d 720, 733-34 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (arguing that women “must follow the natural 
instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than words, the violation of her person by a 
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that a battered woman faces in leaving the relationship or otherwise protecting 
herself from the abuse,148 other commentators have pointed out that “a rule that 
demands the defendant ‘avoid the confrontation’” by leaving the relationship is 
“a ‘pre-retreat’ rule [that] . . . has never been part of standard self-defense 
law.”149  Just as “[t]he man who goes for the fiftieth time to the violent gang-
bar is not deprived of his self-defense claim because he ‘should have left’ 
before the violence erupted,” the law should likewise recognize that “[t]here is 
no general duty to avoid violence before the confrontation” when battered 
women raise a claim of self-defense.150 
Once again, the battered woman is simply asking the courts to faithfully 
apply the standard self-defense doctrine to her case, something that the courts 
are seemingly reluctant to do.151  In her survey of twenty years of self-defense 
cases in which imminence factored as a major issue, Victoria Nourse found 
that most of the cases involving battered women, like most of the rest of her 
sample, involved killings during a confrontation – not killings while the 
batterer was asleep or otherwise following “a significant time lag.”152  Thus, 
 
stranger or an unwelcomed friend,” and asking there why the victim “did not seek a means of 
escape,” “did not even ‘try the door’ to determine if it was locked,” and “fail[ed] to flee, summon 
help, scream, or make physical resistance”); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 
(Pa. 1994) (observing that the woman there “‘took no physical action to discourage [the man],’” 
and “never attempted to go to the door or unlock it”) (quoting trial transcript).  In that context, 
feminist critics of the rape laws have pointed out that such arguments reflect the law’s historic 
devaluation of women’s testimony and its insistence on holding women to the “traditional male 
notion of a fight.”  SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 62 (1987).  See also People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 
110, 117-18, 118-19 (Cal. 1986) (pointing out that “[t]he requirement that a woman resist her 
attacker appears to have been grounded in the basic distrust with which courts and commentators 
traditionally viewed a woman’s testimony regarding sexual assault,” and citing studies showing 
that “while some women respond to sexual assault with active resistance, others [may] ‘freeze,’” 
smile, or appear calm). 
 148. See supra notes 80, 114-19, 140-42, and accompanying text. 
 149. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1284. 
 150. Id.  See also Dutton, supra note 104, at 1226-27 (noting that the “common perception 
[that a battered woman should leave the relationship] is contrary to a fundamental legal premise” 
because “‘[t]he law has always been clear . . . that a person has no obligation to rearrange her . . . 
entire life, or even inconvenience [her]self, in order to avoid a situation in which the need to act 
in self-defense might arise’”) (quoting CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: 
BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 146 (1989)); Rosen, supra note 137, at 396-
97 (noting that even if a battered woman “could have escaped safely from her house and fled to 
Alaska, where she could change her identity and live happily, and safely, ever after,” the law has 
never “required completely innocent people to behave in this fashion” and has never demanded 
“[r]enunciation of personal and family identity”).  Cf. Maguigan, supra note 7, at 419 (noticing 
the “tendency to blur the definition of the retreat rule with the question of whether the woman 
could have escaped the relationship”). 
 151. See Nourse, supra note 7. 
 152. Id. at 1253. 
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the imminence standard tended to “operate as a proxy for any number of other 
self-defense factors.”153  The real hurdle battered women faced was that their 
“cases are in general not seen as ‘real fights,’” so that “even when the cases are 
confrontational – when the gun is pointed at her – they still are not seen as 
confrontational.”154  These findings led Nourse to conclude that the imminence 
requirement is “far from as settled or coherent as it is assumed to be.”155 
Nourse contends, however, that focusing on the necessity for self-defense 
instead of imminence, as suggested above, does not “resolve the potential for 
conflict in the law of imminence,” but “simply transform[s] the question of the 
meaning of imminence into the meaning of necessity.”156  But, as Nourse and 
others have aptly noted, standard criminal doctrine does not invariably require 
a strict finding of necessity in order to justify a self-defense acquittal.  The law 
of self-defense “depart[s] from the rule of ‘objective necessity’”157 when it 
allows a defendant to kill in self-defense if facing a threat of only serious 
bodily harm158 and when it refuses to require defenders to first fire a warning 
shot.159  Additionally, and most notable for our purposes, the law of self-
defense in most jurisdictions deviates from a strict necessity requirement when 
it allows the use of deadly force despite the availability of a clear path of 
retreat.160  The law thereby evidences a willingness to defer to “manly 
instincts” without even flinching,161 while insisting that battered women satisfy 
 
 153. Id. at 1236 (specifying “strength of threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression” as the 
issues for which imminence operated as a proxy). 
 154. Id. at 1286.  This finding corroborates the similar conclusion Holly Maguigan reached 
based on her survey of 270 appellate court opinions issued in 223 battered women’s homicide 
cases.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 155. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1237. 
 156. Id. at 1271.  See also id. at 1276-77 (noting that self-defense law’s view as to what 
conduct is “necessary” has shifted over time). 
 157. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 333 (1996). 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 329; Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270. 
 159. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270.  See also Rosen, supra note 137, at 396 (noting that 
“[t]he possibility always exists that a person attacking another with a gun will change his mind, or 
miss, or have a heart attack before pulling the trigger,” and thus concluding that “the law never 
requires the necessity to be absolute before allowing self-defense”). 
 160. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270; Rosen, supra note 137, at 388-90. 
 161. Estrich, supra note 56, at 1434.  See also State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961) 
(concluding that a retreat requirement would “demand what smacks of cowardice” because “the 
manly thing to do is to hold one’s ground”); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 5.7(f) (noting 
that the majority approach is based on “a policy against making one act a cowardly and 
humiliating role”). 
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a special “pre-retreat” requirement unenforced elsewhere in self-defense 
law.162 
V.  JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE? 
Critics of battered women’s self-defense claims also argue that women 
claiming self-defense in non-confrontational cases are really advancing an 
excuse for their conduct, rather than a justification,163 and therefore, 
presumably by definition, are not entitled to the justification of self-defense.  
Under well-established principles of criminal law, however, even self-defense 
is not invariably a justification.  For example, the defense is available when a 
defendant kills a perfectly innocent person who the defendant reasonably, but 
mistakenly believed was about to launch an attack.  In those circumstances, the 
defense operates more as an excuse than a justification.164  Moreover, as 
explained above, standard self-defense doctrine departs from a strict 
requirement of necessity in certain instances, thereby also deviating from our 
usual notions of justification.165 
The ambiguous nature of self-defense – a defense widely thought of as a 
justification – confirms that the criminal law does not clearly distinguish 
between justifications and excuses.166  One commentator has thus written that 
 
 162. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 157, at 373, 333 (accusing self-defense law of 
“appear[ing] to shift opportunistically” because “to say that the law cannot be adjusted to 
privilege deadly force” used by “a woman who kills rather than endure the degradation of 
continued abuse . . . because the law never ranks the defendant’s honor and dignity over a 
wrongful aggressor’s life betrays either extreme confusion or hypocrisy”). 
 163. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 86, at 242-43; Coughlin, supra note 83, at 28 (referring to 
the “battered woman syndrome defense” as a “special excuse for women”); Margulies, supra note 
82, at 63 (arguing that the battered woman syndrome “sounds largely in the key of excuse, not 
justification”); Morse, supra note 53, at 12-13; Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: 
Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 
43-44 (1986) (maintaining that “successful use of the battered person’s defense theory . . . is 
inherently inconsistent with the concept of justification,” and therefore advocating that self-
defense be thought of as an excuse). 
 164. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 66, at 767; Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: 
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 283-84 (1975); 
Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 732, 739. 
 165. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954 
(1985); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (observing that there is no “systematic” difference between the two); 
Robinson, supra note 164, at 276 (noting that “[t]he early common law distinction between 
justification and excuse exists today only in theory”). 
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the whole issue is “much ado about little.”167  On the other hand, Stephen 
Morse has staked out the contrary position, describing this as “one of the most 
important issues modern criminal law thought has addressed,” in large part 
because “the law is a teacher that sets moral and social standards” and “the 
distinction encourages doing right and deters doing wrong.”168  He may well 
have a point, but one wonders why those same concerns are not raised when 
male defendants who did “wrong,” but made a reasonable mistake about the 
need to use defensive force, are acquitted on grounds of self-defense. 
From the perspective of the individual defendant, presumably most people 
would be indifferent between a not guilty verdict based on a justification and 
one based on an excuse.  As Glanville Williams observed, “the distinction does 
not concern the person who is charged with the offence in question and who 
sets up the defence.”169  Anne Coughlin rejects that assumption, however, 
arguing that battered women are in fact “harmed by the finding of 
irresponsibility that their successful excuse defenses incur” because “the 
dubious moral status occupied by the excused actor – that creature who is more 
like a ‘dog’ or a ‘rock’ than a human being” – reinforces gender stereotypes 
and thus “has profound implications for the construction of gender.”170  
Interestingly, Coughlin’s description of defendants who raise a successful 
duress defense has very a different tone.  Quoting Michael Moore’s comment 
that the threats which give rise to a duress defense “interfere with one’s normal 
ability or opportunity to do what is morally or legally required,”171 Coughlin 
observes that the defendant who acts under duress is excused because “the 
alternatives open to him were so agonizing that we accept his claim that he was 
carrying out a course of conduct that he did not choose – and would not have 
chosen – for himself.”172  Thus, in Coughlin’s view, “[t]he model of the 
responsible actor is heavily inscribed on the duress defense” even though, as 
she notes, duress is generally considered an excuse rather than a 
justification.173  Why don’t those defendants suffer from the same “dubious 
moral status” as the battered woman Coughlin characterizes as “less than a full 
 
 167. Rosen, supra note 137, at 407-08 (noting that “[n]either jurors nor putative defendants 
are aware of the subtle differences between a justification and excuse, and . . . few judges could 
explain the difference”). 
 168. Morse, supra note 53, at 7. 
 169. Williams, supra note 164, at 732. 
 170. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 23-24. 
 171. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1129 (1985) 
(quoted in Coughlin, supra note 83, at 15 n.65). 
 172. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 16. 
 173. Id. at 29-30 n.143. 
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human being”?174  Why do we simply “withhold blame” from defendants 
excused by duress rather than “harm[] [them] by [a] finding of 
irresponsibility”?175  While Coughlin is certainly right to criticize the gender 
stereotypes that underlay the now-discarded doctrine of marital coercion,176 
one wonders whether it is those same stereotypes – and the devaluation of 
women, their experiences, and their stories that they reflect – that lead her to 
describe a battered woman’s self-defense claim so differently from that of the 
defendant who acted under duress. 
VI.  THE ABUSE EXCUSE 
A related objection argues that battered women’s self-defense claims fall 
prey to “the determinist reductio”177 or – in somewhat more colorful terms – 
that they are illustrative of the “abuse excuse” crisis sweeping through criminal 
law.178  According to Stephen Morse, the fact that a defendant may be able to 
pinpoint a cause for her use of violence – i.e., the history of abuse in the case 
of battered women – cannot give rise to a defense because “[p]resumably all 
phenomena of the universe are caused by the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that produce them.”179 Allowing “determinism or universal 
causation [to] underwrite[] responsibility,” Morse continues, “threatens to 
undermine notions of personal responsibility that are vital to human dignity 
and the fair operation of the criminal justice system.”180  In a similar vein, Alan 
Dershowitz argues that “the abuse excuse is a symptom of a general abdication 
of responsibility” that “is dangerous to the very tenets of democracy, which 
presuppose personal accountability for choices and actions.”181  And, 
according to Dershowitz, “[i]t all began with the so-called battered woman 
syndrome.”182 
 
 174. Id. at 4.  Cf. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1454 (making a similar point with respect to 
provocation, noting that “[f]ew scholars . . . have urged that we eliminate the provocation defense 
because it diminishes men’s moral agency”). 
 175. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 30, 23 (observing that duress is characterized as an excuse 
because “the community prefers that actors not offend, even under the pressure of serious threats, 
but will withhold blame where the threats are sufficiently grievous”). 
 176. See supra note 97. 
 177. Morse, supra note 53, at 8. 
 178. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 3 (defining the “abuse excuse” as “the legal tactic by 
which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation”). 
 179. Morse, supra note 53, at 8. 
 180. Id. at 8, 9. 
 181. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 4. 
 182. Id. at 45.  See also FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 140 (arguing that “we are witnessing the 
beginning of a transformation of the battered women’s syndrome into a general defense of abuse 
as a justification for retaliation”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble 
with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 854-55 (1995) (arguing that “an abusive partner, and similar 
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These critiques are valid, at least to a point.  As Michael Moore noted 
almost twenty years ago, the ability to identify a causal factor that explains 
one’s crime cannot itself afford an excuse because “the causal theory of excuse 
leads to the absurd conclusion that no one is responsible for anything.”183  The 
real question is whether the particular causative factor indicates blamelessness 
– a question that cannot be answered without making a subjective value 
judgment as to which causal factors ought to constitute excuses.184  Once 
again, then, the problem with this critique is that the law governing criminal 
defenses has always been comfortable accepting determinist arguments in 
certain contexts – that, in the words of Victoria Nourse, “almost all excuses 
become abuse excuses.”185  Thus, the law takes it for granted that reasonable 
people will use deadly force when confronted by an “uplifted knife,”186 that the 
man who finds his wife in bed with someone else will lose control and react 
with violence,187 and that no “manly” individual will retreat from home in 
order to escape an attacker.188  Why are those defendants not asked to take 
“personal responsibility” for their actions?  Or, as Nourse puts it, “why not 
demand that those who act under duress or provocation also exercise self-
control?”189 
Likewise, although Professor Dershowitz is certainly correct in pointing 
out that “the vast majority of people who have experienced abuse . . . do not 
commit violent crimes,”190 the same can be said of defenses long accepted by 
the criminal law.  Many people faced with an “uplifted knife” will not respond 
 
predisposing conditions do not by themselves negate responsibility,” and “we must condemn and 
seek to deter criminal acts when the perpetrators could have done otherwise – even if their 
motives evoke sympathy”). 
 183. Moore, supra note 171, at 1092. 
 184. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 157, at 274 (maintaining that the so-called “abuse 
excuse” is a sign not of “lawlessness,” but of the law’s “responsiveness . . . to changes in . . . 
social norms”); Morse, supra note 53, at 9 (acknowledging that “free will is often just a hand-
waving placeholder for the conclusion that the defendant ought to be excused”). 
 185. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1446, 1447 (explaining that most of criminal law’s well-
accepted defenses – such as self-defense, duress, insanity, and provocation – are based on the 
“behavioristic causal explanation” that the defendant’s “practical ability to choose, and thus to 
exercise self-control, has been impaired”). 
 186. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (“Detached reflection cannot be 
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”). 
 187. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
 189. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1447.  Cf. Chiu, supra note 94, at 1239 (describing how 
various aspects of the law are inconsistent as to whether they view battered women as “purely 
agents, purely victims, or a combination of both”). 
 190. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 5-6. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
190 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:155 
 
with defensive force,191 most people who find their partner in bed with another 
will not react violently,192 and some who are subjected to threats will not 
succumb and commit a crime.193  Nevertheless, the fact that many people are 
able to avoid violent or otherwise criminal behavior in these circumstances has 
not led to widespread outcry for the abolition of the defenses of duress, 
provocation, or self-defense.194  Nor has the fact that, to a large extent, these 
defenses, premised as they are on a male model of behavior, tend to be of 
greatest benefit to a subset of society – namely, men – who are more likely to 
act in ways that require that they avail themselves of the defenses.  To return to 
Victoria Nourse once again, “law has always exercised judgment; it simply has 
lost the ability to see that this is what it is doing.”195 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“Allowing victims of abuse to invoke an abuse excuse, while doing 
nothing to prevent the underlying abuse, is little more than symbolism on the 
 
 191. See State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570 (N.J. 1997) (commenting that “[t]he male 
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“[f]amiliar images of self-defense are a soldier, a man protecting his home, family, or the chastity 
of his wife, or a man fighting off an assailant”). 
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CRIMINOLOGY 726, 735-36 (1995) (describing provocation as a “male-oriented doctrine” because 
it primarily benefits male defendants by “mitigating the predominantly male reaction of 
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1679, 1692, 1697 (1986) (noting that historically only men were deemed reasonably provoked by 
witnessing an act of spousal adultery, and that even our contemporary gender-neutral standard is 
“a shallow concession to equality” given that “women rarely react to their husband’s infidelity 
with deadly violence”). 
 193. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 446-47 (2d ed. 1960) 
(characterizing as “debatable” the assumption that people “will always choose to live even though 
they must kill unoffending persons to preserve themselves”). 
 194. Note, however, that in 1997, the Maryland legislature amended its definition of 
manslaughter so as to provide that “[t]he discovery of one’s spouse engaged in sexual intercourse 
with another does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the purpose of mitigating a 
killing from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked 
by that discovery.”  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 2-207(b) (2002).  The law was passed in response 
to several Maryland cases where a husband successfully avoided a murder conviction by claiming 
that he was provoked to kill his wife because he discovered or suspected that she was having an 
affair.  See Kimberly Wilmot-Weidman, After a Three-Year Fight, Murder Is Finally Murder in 
Maryland, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1997, § CN (Womanews), at 1. 
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cheap,” Alan Dershowitz charges.196  In somewhat less provocative terms, 
Anne Coughlin urges that we “change our experiences, perhaps even eliminate 
domestic violence,” by “persuad[ing] the community to change its assumptions 
about gender relationships.”197  It is certainly important to remind ourselves to 
keep our eyes on the ball – not to allow the relatively small number of cases 
where battered women kill their abusers under non-confrontational 
circumstances to divert our attention from the plight of the much larger number 
of women victimized by domestic violence.  But I know of no one who 
advocates “doing nothing” about these larger issues and simply focusing on 
self-defense as the solution to the problem of domestic violence. 
The difficulty in the short run with the suggestion that we focus our energy 
on putting an end to domestic violence is that cases involving non-
confrontational killings do arise, and they make their way to court.  From the 
individual defendant’s perspective, as Catharine MacKinnon noted in another 
context, “[a] prison term is a big price to pay for principle” and “arousing the 
sexism of the jury may appear her only chance of acquittal.”198  From a broader 
societal perspective, the criminal justice system is charged with the immediate 
task of assessing culpability and must therefore attempt to adjudicate the merits 
of a battered woman’s self-defense claim in a principled manner. 
In the longer term, the difficulty with the proposal that we simply end 
domestic violence is that it is much easier said than done.  As our experience 
with thirty years of reform efforts has demonstrated, the gender bias that leads 
individual men to feel free to beat their partners – and that leads society to treat 
that violence more cavalierly than it treats stranger assaults – is so well 
entrenched that it has proven very resistant to change.  In the meantime, and 
certainly while we continue our efforts to end violence against women, we 
should also recognize the gender bias so firmly embedded in our criminal laws 
and strive to give battered women’s self-defense claims the same consideration 
we have traditionally afforded to defenses raised by male defendants. 
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